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RESUMEN 
Este artículo examina y propone alternativas institucionales para el constitucio-
nalismo popular. La propuesta es una combinación progresiva de instituciones 
que buscan dotar a la ciudadanía con el poder final para determinar qué significa 
una constitución, contribuyendo a asegurar su libertad republicana, implemen-
tando mecanismos de deliberación, al tiempo que es respetuoso de una forma 
particular de comprender la igualdad política. El artículo comienza con una 
descripción del constitucionalismo popular y de los principios que considero 
que deberían fundamentar la teoría. Luego, procede a examinar críticamente 
diversas propuestas institucionales presentes en la literatura. Después de mostrar 
las áreas en las que dichas propuestas se quedan cortas en el esfuerzo de encar-
nar los principios aquí defendidos, el artículo aboga por la implementación de 
cuatro mecanismos que, según sostendré, sí se acercan más a dichos objetivos.
PALABRAS CLAVE 
Constitucionalismo popular, republicanismo, diseño institucional, delibera-
ción, equidad política.
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INTRODUCTION
This article examines and proposes institutional instantiations for popular 
constitutionalism. The proposal is a progressive combination of institutions 
aiming at giving the citizenry the opportunity to determine what a consti-
tution means, contributing to securing their liberty in a republican sense, 
implementing mechanisms of deliberation, and being respectful to a particular 
understanding of political equality.
The paper proceeds as follows: section i describes popular constitutional-
ism and the principles grounding my own understanding of the theory. By 
relying on work undertaken elsewhere, I argue that giving the final word in 
constitutional interpretation to citizens requires a republican, deliberative, 
and egalitarian combination of institutional conditions and mechanisms.
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Section ii examines institutional alternatives available in the literature meant 
to implement popular constitutionalism. I do this to justify why additional 
measures are required. I discuss proposals by Kramer, Donnelly, and Pozen, 
as they are some of the most articulated ones available in the literature. These 
proposals fall short of achieving popular constitutionalism’s goal of giving the 
final word in constitutional interpretation to the people themselves.
Section iii elaborates my own proposals. It argues for the implementation 
of the following mechanisms compatible with the republican, deliberative and 
egalitarian principles I champion: contestation without erga omnes effects, 
commonwealth-constitutionalism’s judicial review, parliamentary delibera-
tion and justification, and interpretive constitutional mini-publics. They are 
presented and defended in a progressive manner; moving from mechanisms 
already available in most contemporary polities to democratic innovations 
whose employment is less frequent, but which are nevertheless well grounded 
in social theory.
The proposals are conditioned in different ways. First, they do not exhaust 
the range of solutions necessary to realise the principles summarised in sec-
tion i. The magnitude and reach of those desiderata overflow any concrete 
institutional arrangement one could propose. Institutional design must aim 
at realising principles to the greatest possible extent. One must be aware, 
however, that those arrangement will likely run short of reaching the objec-
tives set by their guiding principles. This is not a limitation as such, but how 
regulative ideals operate.
There is also an issue of domain. Should popular constitutionalists focus 
on realising the theory`s principles outside representative institutions? Or 
should they aim at improving representative government? This is, I think, a 
false dilemma whose resolution hinges on the notion of representation one 
endorses. As I make clear below, I endorse a notion of representation that does 
not disconnect representatives from the discursive preferences of those they 
represent. Representative institutions, in such a model, do not exist simply 
by virtue of practical necessities like scale and time. They are a necessary 
component of the justification of our collective societal decisions. The ques-
tion is, then, not so much do we need representatives, but how do we facilitate 
discursive transmissions from the public sphere to representative institutions.
These considerations do not treat discussions on the justification of rep-
resentative government as irrelevant. But the topic is complex enough as to 
merit an examination I cannot fully provide here. I thus take sides with one 
specific understanding of representation because it allows me to interpret the 
relationship between ordinary citizens and representative formal institutions 
as a continuum rather than as a solution for practicalities of scale. This is 
compatible with and accounts for the features of popular constitutionalism I 
advocate for: popular constitutionalism coexists with representative institutions.
186 Donald Bello Hutt
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 48, enero-abril de 2021, pp. 183-214
My endorsement of republicanism, deliberative democracy, and political 
equality implies that the people themselves are entitled to discuss, and ca-
pable of discussing, the merits, justice, fairness, defects, etc., of the available 
alternatives in a decision-making process, not just about the effects the chosen 
alternatives will have on themselves, but also on the rest of the members of 
the polity they are part of. This is, admittedly, a lot to ask from a single insti-
tutional recommendation. 
This entails a difficulty with regard to the pre-conditions under which an 
institution is supposed to operate, as it would make little sense to incorporate 
institutional devices that put the people themselves to deliberate in polities 
where no basic rights and basic material conditions are guaranteed. It is in-
deed wishful thinking to expect that people deprived of such conditions will 
be in fact capable and willing to discuss complex collective affairs. These 
conditions are demanded by the material dimension of ead. The success of 
the institutional proposals I here make depend on an initial realisation of that 
principle, notwithstanding they also materialise and strengthen it. The capac-
ity of the public within the deliberative process thus depends on its “support 
of a societal basis in which equal rights of citizenship have become socially 
effective”.1 Just how exactly these preconditions would be implemented and/
or satisfied is beyond the scope of this paper.
Section iv concludes.
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLES
This section presents the normative principles guiding my understanding 
of popular constitutionalism. It serves two purposes. First, these principles 
serve as standards of criticism for the alternatives available in the literature. 
Second, they operate as regulative ideals for my own proposals.
A brief sketch of popular constitutionalism is called for. Popular consti-
tutionalism is a theory mostly developed in the United States,2 whose most 
general claim is that it should be the people themselves the ones who should 
have the final word in constitutional interpretation. The expression the people 
themselves, taken from Madison,3 means that citizens have the right to be final 
authorities in ascribing meaning to their constitution.4 This broad definition 
encompasses two theses. First, the descriptive thesis that traditionally, and 
increasingly, the task of giving authoritative and final interpretations to the 
1 HaBermas (1996, 308).
2 There are noteworthy exceptions outside the US as well. See alterio & niemBro 
orteGa (2013); GarGarella (2013); rodríGuez Garavito (2013); linares (2013); tusHnet 
(2013); HoGG & BusHell (2013); lorenzetti (2013).
3 madison (2006).
4 For example, levinson (2000); BalKin (2003); Kramer (2007).
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constitution is given to the judiciary.5 Second, the normative contention that 
this power could and should belong to a different agent. Authors generally 
understand the people themselves to be actual citizens, persons who should 
be given the chance to have a say and steer the ongoing process of giving 
meaning to the constitution.6
After a period of strong scholarly interest raised by the publication of Larry 
Kramer’s The People Themselves,7 the theory experienced a decline.8 One of 
the main reasons explaining this decay is, I submit, a lack of convergence on 
principles grounding the claims popular constitutionalists generally endorse. This 
normative feebleness has led popular constitutionalists, for example, to debate 
whether the Tea Party constitutes an example of popular constitutionalism,9 
which poses a challenge to those equating the theory with a progressive read-
ing of the constitution10. Moreover, some commentators have pointed to link-
ages between popular constitutionalism and originalism. Both categories are, 
however, prima facie incompatible due to the originalist commitment to the 
preserve the dead hand of the past as a criterion to interpret the constitution.11
The theory thus needs further development. The differences on the nature 
of the claims that seem to fall into the label popular constitutionalism are too 
many as to accept it as a guidance, let alone endorse it, in its current state. 
This section offers an alternative for filling this gap. 
I have elaborated the principles I advocate for elsewhere (Bello Hutt 2018). 
Yet, in a nutshell, my take is the following: popular constitutionalism must 
secure and foster republican liberty and deliberation among citizens, against 
a background of egalitarian conditions demanded by a principle of political 
equality I call Equality of Access and Deliberation (ead). I will not expound 
these concepts in full detail here, but it is important to sketch them for the 
sake of the present argument.
5 Also, see, dworKin (1992, 383); acKerman (1997); sHapiro & stone sweet (2002); 
tusHnet (2003, 453); HirscHl (2004); GarGarella (2006, 15); alexander & solum (2005, 
1597); Kramer (2007, 697); GinsBurG (2008); donnelly (2009, 958); niemBro (2013, 195); 
mcconnell (2015, 1783); mac amHlaiGH (2016, 175-176).
6 tusHnet (1999, x, 108); Kramer (2004, 959, 973, 980); Kramer (2005, 1344); don-
nelly (2009, 957).
7 As affirmed by a commentator, Kramer’s book struck a nerve. It was reviewed in almost 
every major law review, and in most newspapers in the United States: “The People Themselves 
has generated intense discussion concerning the rise of judicial power in the United States and the 
role of popular politics in retraining, or failing to restrain, that power of the course of American 
history” (D. W. Hamilton 2006, 809). To name a few publications commenting on The People 
Themselves: cHemerinsKy, 2004; post & sieGel 2004; carney 2005, 493; Braveman 2005.
8 See, for example, Knowles & Toia, claiming that “there is reason to believe that ‘popular 
constitutionalism, as it is used by academic writing in law journals, is no longer a meaningful 
concept” (2014, 34).
9 E. g., scHmidt (2011, 7).
10 scHwartzBerG (2011); post & sieGel (2009, 31).
11 zietlow (2012, 485-486).
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Republicanism is constituted by two main principles, namely, liberty as 
non-domination and civic virtue. Other principles may be part of the repub-
lican ideal, but these two are at the core of any republican account.
The most characteristic feature of republicanism is its conception of 
freedom as non-domination or as a structural independence upon the will of 
another.12 In a republican framework, freedom “is restricted not merely by 
actual interferences or the threat of, but also by our awareness of the mere 
fact that we are living in dependence on the good goodwill of others”.13 Thus 
conceived, freedom is defined a status in virtue of which an agent is not 
subjected to the domination of an individual or a group. In turn, individuals 
have dominating power over others to the extent that they have a capacity 
to interfere with the dominated agent, that this interference is brought about 
on an arbitrary basis, and that is made regarding certain choices that the 
dominated agent is in a position to make.14
In turn, deliberative democracy is a theory whose core claims are that 
collective decisions should be adopted via a method of deliberation, with the 
inclusion of all potentially affected by the decisions.15 Accordingly, delibera-
tion operates as a justification as well as a condition for the legitimacy of the 
decisions adopted.16 Additionally, it has the nature of a regulative ideal — a 
horizon decision-making processes should strive to attain.17 This explains, 
for example, the ideal character of Cohen’s deliberative procedure,18 and 
Habermas’ unlimited community of communication.19
There are valuable instrumental linkages between republican freedom and 
civic virtue pointing at deliberative democracy as the best institutional means 
to prevent domination. This is because being free in a republican sense entails 
that individuals participate in the process by which they give norms to them-
selves, to the greatest extent possible. Moreover, it requires the preferences and 
arguments manifested in the decision-making process to be the highest possible 
expression of autonomous reasoning and not of preferences imposed by oth-
ers. These are conditions that deliberative democracy is meant to implement.
Deliberative democrats consider that political participation is achieved 
when every potentially affected person by an eventual decision is present 
as a discussant. This provides distinctiveness to its ideal of participation, 
12 For definitions of republican liberty, see sydney (1698, p. 17), pettit (1997, pp. 51-79; 
2002, pp. 339-342; 2012, pp. 7-8, 26-74), sKinner (1998, p. 70; 2002, p. 247; 2008, p. x), larmore 
(2001, pp. 229-230), mccormicK (2011, p. 145) and lovett (2014).
13 sKinner (2002, p. 247).
14 pettit (1997, 52).
15 elster (1998, 8).
16 manin (1987, 359); Gutmann & tHompson (1996, 4); BoHman (1996, 4); BoHman 
(1998, 401, 402); BoHman (2009, 28); cHamBers (2003, 308); martí (2006, 22).
17 Kant (1996: A569-B597); martí (2006, 25); mansBridGe et al. (2010, 65).
18 coHen (1998, 67, 72-9).
19 HaBermas (1993, 56).
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compared to other political theories, a difference well portrayed by Elster’s 
metaphor: in a deliberative democracy, democratic participation is modelled 
on a forum, not in a market. Inclusion is instrumental to the republican cause 
by guaranteeing the right to be present in a substantive way, to the extent that 
individuals are affected by the potential decision adopted.
Deliberative democracy also puts into place the conditions for individuals 
to express their preferences, hear the preferences of others, weigh them, form, 
transform them, and justify them in a context of relative equality, so that no 
individual is able to arbitrarily impose her own view to others.
Reading these two theories as compatible to each other entail the endorse-
ment of ead. The relation of ead with deliberative democracy and republi-
canism, is intrinsic, meaning that eliminating or reducing the domination of 
some agents over others is linked to the guarantee of the equal possibility of 
having a say, justifying one’s preferences and considering those of others.
ead comprises two principles: equality of access and equality in deliberation. 
First, equality of access means that all potentially affected by collective decisions 
must have the equal opportunity of entering the fora where those decisions are 
adopted. Second, equality in deliberation requires that decision-making pro-
cesses be sensitive enough as to be able to capture, make visible, and consider 
the claims of all the participants in the debate in non-dominating manners.
Taken together, these principles give substance to the main theses en-
dorsed by popular constitutionalists – giving the citizenry the final word in 
the interpretation of a constitution is conducive to enhancing their freedom 
as non-domination, to the extent that the process by citizens impose meaning 
to their constitution allows all those potentially affected persons the possibil-
ity to discuss and decide on the best available meaning. Such process must 
include egalitarian safeguards for the inclusion, and for non-dominating 
deliberation within the deliberative decision-making forum.
II. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE IN THE LITERATURE
I now examine institutional proposals made by four popular constitutional-
ists: Kramer, Donnelly, and Pozen, I show that, to different degrees and for 
different reasons, they fail to meet the republican and deliberative conditions 
described above.
A. Kramer’s proposal
Kramer’s positive contributions to popular constitutionalism are rather limited:20
20 Additional limitations of Kramer’s account are discussed in Beaumont (2014). I share 
those critiques. However, because they are limited to the United States Constitutional history 
and practice, I will not discuss them here.
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[j]ustices can be impeached, the [Supreme] Court’s budget can be slashed, the 
President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or shrink 
its size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome new responsibilities 
or revise its procedures.21
Not all of these measures advance the popular constitutionalists’ agenda. It is 
hard to see why and how impeachment, budget cuts, changes in the court’s size 
or increasing administrative or bureaucratic burdens on judges would realise 
the principle that the people themselves should be final constitutional interpret-
ers. They would hinder the exercise of judicial prerogatives but would leave 
the central issue untouched, as neither of them involve modifying the courts’ 
competences and attributions. Courts burdened with these measures may still 
retain the final word. The only difference perhaps, would be noticed in the 
quality of their judgements or in the time it may take the court to issue them.
Revising the courts’ procedures and competences, on the other hand, aims 
in the right direction. Procedures condition competences, and to the extent that 
courts are constrained procedurally as final authorities, their political power 
is likely to be transferred to other agents. Yet, Kramer just mentions these 
measures without elaborating on how they would work in practice. Instead, 
Kramer provided a “framework in which to think about such matters”,22 based 
on what he calls “Madison’s theory of deliberative democracy”,23 namely, a 
departamentalist account of the inner workings of the principle of separation 
of powers, more than an actual deliberative model.
This model is weak from a republican and a deliberative standpoint. He 
calls deliberativist a model that is closer to one whose aim is “to aggregate 
individual preferences into a collective choice in as fair and efficient a way 
as possible”24. The departamentalism he endorses seeks to guarantee the 
community’s control over the interpretation of constitutional law achieved 
through a system amounting “to a competition of understandings among 
political officials that, by forcing the leadership class to appeal to the com-
munity for support, would simultaneously inform public opinion and secure 
its sovereignty”.25 But this is more Schumpeterian than deliberative. No 
further reflections are offered on how each branch would come up with its 
own position on constitutional matters, nor on the ways public opinion could 
be influenced, included, how it would deliberate, and what its role would be 
within a system of deliberation other than being a reference point to which 
public authorities ought to direct their attention.
21 Kramer (2004a, 249).
22 Kramer (2007, 702).
23 Kramer (2007, 748).
24 miller (1992, 55).
25 Kramer (2007, 749).
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Kramer’s model is also problematic from a republican standpoint, particu-
larly with regard to the notion of control. In his wording, popular constitu-
tionalism’s basic idea is “that final authority to control the interpretation and 
implementation of constitutional law resides at all times in the community 
in an active sense” and that “there are countless institutional arrangements 
by which popular control can become meaningful”.26 Control is central in re-
publican democratic accounts. In Pettit’s account, to have a degree of control 
over a result, two things are essential:
First, you must have some influence over the process leading to the result. And 
second, you must use that influence to impose a relevant direction on the process, 
helping to ensure that a suitable result transpires.27
The influence must in turn give rise to a recognisable pattern, and that pattern 
must be one the subject seeks.28 Hence, there is no control “without an influence-
bearing input that controls for the realisation of a suitably patterned output”.29 
There must be a system of popular influence over government that is “equally 
accessible to each and pushes government in a direction […] determined, 
directly or indirectly, by considerations that all can treat as relevant to public 
decision-making”.30 To the extent these conditions obtain, it follows that sub-
jects are not under the arbitrary will of others, that is, they are not dominated. 
Note that the condition for liberty is not that subjects can do whatever they 
want without interference. It means, rather that interferences are legitimate if 
they are not arbitrary ( (Bello Hutt 2017a).
Kramer neither says how individuals would be safe from being dominated 
by state agents nor how individuals could retain final control and thus be 
safe from, in this case, vertical domination by public authorities. Because his 
focus is on institutional dialogue and not on how the broader public sphere 
could permeate formal institutions, state organs could still manipulate the 
decision-making process. Surprisingly, as his reflections become more con-
crete, the more they envision a top-down relationship of state organs with the 
public: departmentalism, in his view, is a process “for channelling different 
positions to the public through functional agencies”.31
So the question is how can we keep this functional agencies controlled? In 
the context of a different debate Kramer argues that “once public sentiment 
has begun to swing decisively in a particular direction, the political branches 
of government will all invariably follow, whatever the personal preferences 
26 Kramer (2007, 703).
27 pettit (2012, 153).
28 pettit (2012, 154).
29 pettit (2012, 154).
30 pettit (2015, 691).
31 Kramer (2007, 749) (My emphasis).
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of their members”.32 But one point made against judicial supremacy is that, 
even if judges decide to align their preferences to that of the public,33 the 
influence of the public is not dispositive. It depends on the willingness of 
judges to accommodate their views to that of the public.
Kramer cannot have it both ways. Instead of trusting that “[o]n any issue 
that captures the public’s attention, where the majority goes is where govern-
ment policy will go”,34 he should have elaborated on specific ways by which 
that adaptation of officials’ views to that of the public does not depend on 
willingness of the former. Otherwise, citizens lose control and capacity to 
determine the direction of constitutional policies and are thus rendered unfree.
B. Donnelly’s “people’s veto”
Donnelly advocates a “people’s veto”, a mechanism for reconsidering con-
stitutional decisions made by the US Supreme Court. This, he claims, would 
promote “ongoing constitutional engagement among average citizens”.35
The process would work by sending to Congress cases decided by the 
Supreme Court by a five-to-four majority. Congress would then have an 
up-or-down vote on public reconsideration. Should Congress vote for recon-
sideration, the case would then be sent to the American people who would 
dictate the outcome by a referendum.36
To make sure that the final decision is made based on considered views 
of the people and to “minimize the likelihood that the American people de-
cide the issue based on a snap judgement, or while in a public frenzy”, the 
mechanism must “allow sufficient time between the Court’s decision and the 
national referendum to allow for sober deliberation”.37
Some criticisms are in order. First, popular constitutionalists’ rejection 
of judicial supremacy is at odds with how the mechanism is supposed to be 
triggered. Inasmuch as it starts in judicial procedures, the court-centrism that 
popular constitutionalists criticise is reaffirmed by positioning the ignition 
of debates on constitutional matters in courts rather than in other institution 
or agent. This means that, initially, the constitutional issue to be debated still 
has to be framed in judicial-legal terms. This has an additional consequence: 
one should be wary of extending the effects of judicial decisions to the entire 
society. The contexts in which trials initiate are limited to problems affecting 
concrete individuals. Hence, additional reasons must be provided to consider 
the conversational context of those trials as relevant for an interpretation 
32 Kramer (2007, 750); Kramer (2004b, 970).
33 daHl (1967, 155); friedman (2009, 380).
34 Kramer (2007, 750).
35 donnelly (2012, 187-188).
36 donnelly (2012, 188).
37 donnelly (2012, 188-189).
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affecting the whole society.38 Individuals who were not parties at the trial at 
hand, could legitimately ask why their normative status has been altered by 
an issue with which they had nothing to in the first place. Put in republican 
terms, they lack control over something that affects them as members of a 
collective unit. As a result, they are rendered unfree.
Second, it is not obvious that the time given to the citizenry between the 
court’s decision and their reconsideration will suffice to form an informed 
and principled judgement on the issue under discussion. It is not obvious 
either that those results will be reached in the absence of additional insti-
tutional structures facilitating deliberation among individuals, about which 
Donnelly is silent.
Third, it is not clear why the mechanism is reserved to five-to-four Su-
preme Court decisions. Donnelly seems to assume that divisions among 
justices somehow amount to social divisiveness outside the court. We know, 
however, that is not the case.39 Also, this sort of mechanism could give judges 
incentives for engaging in pork-barrelling practices.
The people’s veto may be a way of reducing the court’s power, but it 
fails at justifying why ongoing constitutional meaning imposition should be 
triggered judicially and be dependent upon the inner politics of a court that 
is not a representative institution in the first place.
C. Pozen’s “judicial elections”
Pozen wants to show “what judicial elections are capable of – to clarify a 
plausible ideal against which they might be evaluated and in pursuit of which 
they might be engineered”.40 Judicial elections, in his view, would help sus-
tain the democratic legitimacy of constitutional law in a more persistent and 
nuanced way than traditional reform mechanisms.41 They would do this for 
reasons related to the electors and to the judges. I am interested in the second.
Elections would foster virtues inside the courthouse in three ways: judicial 
restraint, judicial populism, and role fidelity. Pozen uses the term ‘restraint’ 
as a regulative ideal for the judicial function “aimed at minimizing interfer-
ence with the political process”.42 This restraint would depend on different 
factors related to the political and electoral incentives of the actors involved.43 
First, “through the types of jurisprudes favored by the electorate”,44 so that 
38 The expression “conversational context” is marmor’s (2014, 149).
39 GarGarella (1996, 181); waldron (2016, 256-257).
40 pozen (2010, 2066).
41 pozen (2010, 2072).
42 pozen (2010, 2077).
43 pozen (2010, 2077).
44 pozen (2010, 2077).
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the court’s composition is tied to the voters’ preferences. The court is likely 
to restraint itself if its members profess some form of judicial minimalism. 
Second, judges may be prone to restraint themselves if they consider that 
this is what the public desires, so that they can keep their job. This is sup-
ported by literature that shows ways in which judges are responsive to their 
institutional environment.45
Regarding judicial populism, that is, the adaptation of the judges’ views of 
the law to those of the public, Pozen argues that there are two ways in which 
such deference could be implemented. The first is the standard prescription 
in the literature, namely, “cede as much ground as possible to the coordi-
nate branches”.46 But Pozen considers an additional option: “that the judge 
[incorporates] into her decision-making calculus the beliefs of the citizenry, 
to the extent she can perceive them, irrespective of what the legislature or 
executive has done”;47 to “mirror popular views”.48 He calls this majoritar-
ian judicial review.49
Yet, the proposal echoes the problem evinced by the authors previously 
discussed. That is, the insistence on turning the judiciary into a more popular 
and political institution. The focus should be on the effects a decision would 
produce on the context against which potentially affected persons receive 
its effects. Courts are limited in their capacity to grasp preferences different 
than the ones expressed in the cases brought before them. This is normal, 
for they are not representative institutions, which means that majoritarian 
judicial review is really an oxymoron.50
Regarding role fidelity, Pozen examines whether the judges’ selection 
method influences how they decide cases. Pozen suggests that judicial elec-
tions could have the effect of sending judges a signal that consideration for 
“public opinion is part of the job description”.51
These approaches striving to make the judiciary more receptive to majori-
tarian concerns, to democratise it, as it were, strike me as odd.52 If courts are 
countermajoritarian forces in a democracy, and if they are given powers to 
control that majorities decide within the limits of the law and not just having 
electoral incentives and party politics in mind, why is it that Pozen’s reac-
tion is to introduce democratic features in the judiciary? Why not working 
45 Hanssen (1999, 415); pozen (2010, 2078).
46 pozen (2010, 2080).
47 pozen (2010, 2080).
48 friedman (2003, 2598).
49 An approach defended by Bonneau (2009, 15), although Pozen rightly points out that 
this prescription is not novel. See the literature he cites in (2010, 2081). For a similar approach, 
see post & sieGel (2007, 390-391).
50 GarGarella (1996, 181).
51 pozen (2010, 2084).
52 And others as well. See atria 2000.
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on improving mechanism of representation or democratic mechanisms more 
generally, instead?
It is not surprising, then, that Pozen does not delve on how and why the 
citizenry would deliberate on constitutional matters at the level of the informal 
public sphere. He expects that judges will adapt their views to the of the people. 
But those views need to be formed and expressed somehow, and nothing in 
Pozen’s proposal tells us how the people would manifest their preferences in a 
judicial election. In the absence of those deliberative suggestions, the election 
model remains an aggregative scenario and, in these models the transmission 
of information from the politicians to citizens is generally asymmetrical.53
III. REPUBLICAN, DELIBERATIVE, AND EGALITARIAN 
PROPOSALS FOR POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
This section suggests measures for the implementation of popular constitu-
tionalism: contestation without erga omnes effects, commonwealth consti-
tutionalism’s judicial review, parliamentary deliberation and justification, 
and interpretive constitutional mini-publics.
A. Contestation without erga omnes effects
Contestatory mechanisms give citizens the role of invigilators of law through 
the possibility of recursion, encouraging them to be “alert to any possible 
misdoing and ready to challenge and contest the legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities”.54 
The judiciary is perhaps the best example of a contestatory mechanism. Courts 
provide the space for individuals to make claims about what they think the 
constitution means, and how those interpretations affect them. Judicial systems 
thus ensure that individuals are neither vertically nor horizontally dominated.
I agree with Pettit on this point. Forums of contestation are necessary to 
keep government and other individuals from impinging upon the liberty of 
subjects and, indirectly, provide them with tools to guide and control the 
direction of governmental policy (reference redacted). Yet, Pettit does not 
properly justify why he limits his account to contestation, and why he shows 
a distrust towards mass participation and deliberation, discarding them as 
relevant for the protection republican freedom.55 Republicans have good rea-
sons to value and rely on a participatory citizenry: civic engagement is one 
element among others allowing for the vigilance demanded by republicanism.
53 ovejero (2002, 167-170).
54 pettit (2012, 14, 215). Here, Pettit’s reference to judicial authorities must be generally 
understood, in my view, as courts exercising judicial review.
55 For a view supporting this statement, see mccormicK 2011, 152.
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Models that limit vigilance and final control to contestation are also impeded 
in justifying judicial decisions with erga omnes effects. Those, like Pettit, who 
would circumscribe activism to contestation cannot at the same time justify 
giving contestatory institutions like courts the role of final authoritative agents 
in the determination of what counts as binding for the entire society without 
dealing with other sorts of problems that cannot be tackled through contesta-
tion alone.56
Contestation can only indirectly steer the direction of governmental policy, 
for it is mostly a mechanism of reactions, not of action. It is meant to resist 
norms and policy and, through that resistance, to influence them.
In Pettit’s view, contestation in the public sphere needs a distribution of 
labour among citizens based on expertise and organisation, a proposal which 
I endorse as a necessary, not a sufficient condition:
What is needed, obviously, is specialization and organization: in short, a division 
of labour in the exercise of civic vigilance. And that ideal is scarcely unrealis-
tic, since contemporary democracies naturally give life to watchdogs, activist 
bodies – non-governmental organizations – that operate locally, nationally and 
internationally across the various domains of political life. These include bodies 
that specialize, for example, in consumer issues, people’s working conditions, 
women’s rights, environmental institutionalized, racial equality, opportunities for 
the disabled, the conditions of prisoners, gay and lesbian rights, health provision 
and public education.57
As I have said, I agree with Pettit that this is a necessary condition for securing 
individuals’ liberty. On the courts’ side, their contribution to an unconditioned 
individualised system of influence is mostly found at this level of contestation. 
Individuals that go to court to claim that they are being affected by some form 
of either vertical or horizontal domination need to frame their grievances in 
accordance to the set of existing sources available for judges to employ. In 
principle, as much leeway as they could have in interpreting constitutional 
norms, the judges’ primary task is not to advance or create policy, but to 
apply those that are already in place. Deviations from that principle can be 
explained, but they are more difficult to be justified and, in any case, they 
cannot be presented as manifestations of the judicial duty to dictate what the 
law is but as an additional role granted in virtue of their countermajoritarian 
nature. The onus falls on those who welcome strong judiciaries.
There are good examples of the sort of procedures that would help citi-
zens to air their own interpretations of the constitution in courts are those 
56 This is at the core of McCormick’s criticism of Pettit (2011, 154).
57 pettit (2012, 226).
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generically known as writs of amparo, like the ones found in the Chilean,58 
Argentine,59 Mexican,60 Brasilian, 61 and German constitutions.62 These grant 
individuals with a procedure for the protection of constitutional rights, which 
are more informal in their processing than more ordinary procedures, and 
have priority in the courts’ dockets. Procedural differences aside, these writs 
allow individuals to pursue relief from a court when their constitutional rights 
are infringed upon or endangered by an act or omission of a governmental 
authority or another individual. To take Chile as an example, these proce-
dures have proven to be highly effective for the protection of a number of 
constitutional guarantees.63
These procedures meet Pettit’s condition that systems of influence ought to 
be individualised, unconditioned and efficacious,64 but they do not put citizens 
as main actors in the generation of collective norms and policies, including 
those created interpretively. In short, this section does not recommend mecha-
nisms that are not currently available in different polities. My suggestion is, 
rather, that a republican, deliberative and egalitarian popular constitutionalism 
should, as a minimum, include these sorts of devices. Nevertheless, additional 
mechanisms are required.
B. Commonwealth models’ institutions
The commonwealth model of constitutionalism, sometimes referred to as the 
“parliamentary model”,65 is an “intermediate model of constitutionalism that, 
in somewhat different versions, has been adopted in Canada, New Zealand, 
and the United Kingdom as an alternative to their traditional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty”.66 The model consists in the “combination of 
two novel techniques for protecting rights. These are pre-enactment politi-
cal rights and weak-form judicial review”.67 The first asks elective branches 
of government “to engage in right review of a proposed statute before and 
during the bill’s legislative process”.68
The second technique, weak judicial review, decouples judicial review from 
judicial supremacy, meaning that although courts have powers of constitutional 
58 Article 20 of the Chilean Constitution.
59 Article 43 of the Argentine Constitution.
60 Article 103 of the Mexican Constitution.
61 Article 150 of the Brasilian Constitution.
62 Article 93 Sec. 1 Nr. 4 of the German Constitution.
63 couso (2005, 74). The procedure can only be used to protect first generation rights. 
Socio-economic rights are excluded.
64 pettit (2012, 209-238).
65 HieBert (2006).
66 GardBaum (2010, 167-168).
67 GardBaum (2013, 25).
68 GardBaum (2013, 25).
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review, they do not necessarily or automatically have final authority on what 
the law of the land is.69
This is not exclusive to commonwealth models for these features have 
been advocated for by popular constitutionalists as well. Gardbaum argues, 
however, that the Commonwealth model is innovative and distinctive in at 
least three ways. First, weak forms of judicial review are the general rule 
in the exercise of the court’s powers, whereas in popular constitutionalists’ 
models the supremacy of other branches of government is” triggered only 
exceptionally or only periodically”.70 Secondly, models of popular constitu-
tionalism do not include the exercise of a legislative override power. In these 
accounts, courts either defer to the relevant branch or it is the citizenry the 
one holding the final say. By contrast, commonwealth models provide “a far 
more tangible and concrete institutional mechanism of judicial non-finality”.71 
Thirdly, two of the model’s mechanisms – Canada’s constitution ‘notwith-
standing clause and the UK Supreme Court’s power to issue declarations of 
incompatibility - “were entirely novel when introduced”.72
Yet, even though they represent an improvement and a contribution to 
popular constitutionalism, commonwealth mechanisms need additional mea-
sures, for even though they represent a is a non-supremacist form of judicial 
review, their exercise in practice “seems to make little difference to the role 
or influence of [strong] judicial review vis-à-vis the legislature”.73 In the case 
of the United Kingdom, Bellamy argues, although ministers are forced to 
issue a declaration of compatibility of legislation with the Human Rights Act 
and, in spite of the provisions for prior legislative scrutiny of such claims, 
“it is ultimately judicial review by the judges sitting in the relevant courts 
which decides the issue”. Consequently, “legislators come under pressure 
to anticipate the court’s ruling rather than to elaborate a view of their own”. 
The Canadian experience with the use of the notwithstanding clause exhibits 
similar patterns.74 This calls for additional measures.
C. Parliamentary deliberation and justification
Argumentation and justification are features generally present in judicial 
procedures, but largely absent in the legislative field.75 As it happens, those 
who extol representative institutions vis-à-vis judicial institutions, tend to 
69 GardBaum (2013, 26-27).
70 GardBaum (2013, 29).
71 GardBaum (2013, 29); HieBert (2006, 7, 13).
72 GardBaum (2013, 29-30).
73 Bellamy (2007, 47).
74 Bellamy (2007, 47-48).
75 waldron 1999; wintGens 2006; pintore 2010, 36; marcilla 2010, 103; oliver-lalana 
2016, 7.
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frame their arguments in abstraction, mostly at a theoretical level. By con-
trast, a great deal of sophisticated scholarship has been elaborated on judicial 
argumentation and justification.76 By contrast, we lack accounts studying the 
role of parliament in the process of constitutional deliberation.77
Some scholars have taken up this challenge and attempted to elaborate a 
theory of legislative argumentation under the label of legisprudence, that is, 
broadly described, a legal theory that accounts for the principles underlying 
the activity of the legislator. Legisprudents seek to develop those principles 
as well as the ways in which our expectations that legislators put forward, 
debate, and weigh the reasons for which they pass laws, become a reality.
According to Oliver, three theses justify this expectation. The first is a 
normative thesis that says that inasmuch as they are the product of collective 
decision-making, “every law can be taken to entail a claim to justifiability 
which cannot be fulfilled with whatever motives, but calls for good reasons 
and hence requires an argumentative process for these to emerge”.78 The 
second is that legitimacy is not binary but rather a 
gradual and compound magnitude that does not get exhausted in the actual work-
ing of democratic procedures and the legal form given to statutes, for it is also 
bound up with the arguments supporting them, in particular with the ones publicly 
adduced in parliament as the institutionalized centre for lawmaking.79
Thirdly, there is a link between the quality of a law and its underlying reasoning. 
This means that the better the argument for a decision, the higher its quality.80
Legisprudents thus show that there is no principled reason to discard parlia-
ments as constitutional deliberators and, as it happens, given their representa-
tive role, that there are normative reasons to claim that they should engage in 
deliberation and to demand that they justify their decisions. We should expect 
this from our representatives.81
Hence, legisprudence ties the rationality of legislative production to de-
liberative considerations, broadly defined.82 The question is, then, what is it 
that guarantees the deliberativeness of the process. These authors are adamant 
that some argumentative conditions inside parliament must obtain to achieve a 
deliberative minimum. They also rightly underscore the potential that legisla-
tive justification has for the legitimation of the state’s normative production in 
76 For example, alexy 2003a; 2003b; Beatty 2005; BaraK 2012; scHlinK 2012.
77 oliver-lalana (2016, 9).
78 oliver-lalana (2010, 3-4).
79 oliver-lalana (2010, 4).
80 oliver-lalana (2010, 4).
81 waldron (2009, 352).
82 siecKmann (2010, 71-72).
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general, an emphasis which strengthens the case for the including the legislator 
within the scope of legal and not just political actors.83
Yet, the effort can be taken one step further. The normative premises of 
legisprudence are compatible with extending the scope of legal theory not 
only to Parliament or to representative institutions more generally, but to the 
broader public sphere. Legisprudents, however, neglect exploring further 
links between parliaments and the citizenry, not only in terms of legitimacy, 
but in terms of the citizenry’s capacity to deliberate by itself or to be part 
of a deliberative process that contributes to the legitimation of the decision-
making system they are part of. This marks an important difference between 
the legisprudential project and my own: legisprudents generally circumscribe 
their reflections to parliament.84 This is an unnecessary restriction. I also 
believe the difference lies in the ways both projects conceive of the notion 
of representation: for legisprudents, representation is a necessary evil, as it 
were. Considerer, for example, Tschentscher et al.:
Decisions by majority are a necessary restriction, not a fulfilment of discursive 
ideals. Equally, limiting parliamentary debates to elected representatives is only 
an approximation to the ideal of universal participation: if we have to rely on 
participants, we can at least try to keep that group as diverse as possible. Deli-
berative democratic theory should, therefore, focus neither on outcomes nor on 
representation.85
This is a mistake. Although the relationship between representation and de-
liberation is admittedly tense,86 representation is not only a tool for coping 
with practicalities of scale: it is an actual means for channelling discourse. 
This is a more charitable and more compelling understanding of representa-
tion. I suggest that the extension of this project beyond parliament can be 
made by relating the demands of legislative justification with this charitable 
interpretation of representative government on the one hand, and with the 
demands deliberatively expressed by the citizenry on the other.
In this context, I find Urbinati’s account of representation as advocacy 
particularly illuminating. In her words, speech is “a means of mediation that 
belongs to all citizens, linking them and separating them at the same time 
[…]. It gives meaning to voting, which presumes evaluation and discrimina-
tion among articulated opinions […]. Thus, it is not indirectness per se that 
distinguishes representative democracy from direct democracy”.87 Rather, it 
is their lack of simultaneity. Judgement and resolution in modern democracies 
83 wintGens (2006, 5).
84 wintGens (2006); siecKmann (2010); oliver-lalana (2016; 2010).
85 tscHentscHer et al. (2010, 14).
86 BoHman (2012, 76); parKinson (2006, 5); scHäfer (2017, 1).
87 urBinati (2000, 765).
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take place at separate times, but not in disconnection to each other. This entails 
that representation is not only a solution for a practicality, but an actual means 
for citizens to voice their preferences. 
This is absent in accounts providing philosophical foundations for legis-
prudence. Wintgens’, perhaps the most elaborated account available in the 
literature, challenges the notion of legal theory as a construction that focuses 
on adjudication rather than promulgation, in the judiciary rather than in the 
legislature,88 but he does not address the problem of what sort of justification 
could/should be considered not only rational by those potentially affected by 
the legislators’ decisions, but legitimate as well. In my view, the requirement 
that decisions made by legislatures ought to be justified, has a particular 
strength at the constitutional level: when justifying a decision with bearings 
on constitutional matters, when such a decision changes the constitution in 
some way, a duty to provide specific justifications for the interpretation of 
what the constitution means is brought about. The reason is that impositions 
of meaning and explicit changes to the constitution represent an alteration of 
the most basic terms of the social contract. Those terms are ultimately the 
reasons why representatives gain their authority over their subjects in the 
first place, and why subjects would find acceptable to endorse the norms that 
are being imposed on them by legislators.
Habermas’ two-track model as well as deliberative systemic approaches 
resonate in this double extension of the legisprudential demand for legis-
lative justification. The relationship between the formal and the informal 
public sphere is better accounted for if one abandons the idea, exemplified 
by Tschentscher et al.’s quote above, that representation is just a practical 
tool for dealing with scale, space and time constraints and if one understands 
the concept as an enabler for deliberation.
The question is, then, what sort of framework would be optimal for assess-
ing the type of conversation that would transmit deliberations taking place in 
the informal public sphere to parliaments, in ways that parliamentary delib-
erations represent individual not only territorially, but discursively as well. 
Such a framework would make deliberative democracy and legisprudence 
compatible to each other.
The compatibility between these concepts and theories is something that 
has yet not been explored. This is the case in legisprudence and its linkage 
to deliberation outside parliaments, but is it also the case with deliberative 
democracy. Consider Boswell et al’s contention that “beyond ideal theoretical 
prescriptions, we still know very little about if and how […] different delib-
erative sites link together, and how they constitute an inclusive deliberative 
system in practice”.89
88 wintGens (2006, 4-8).
89 Boswell et al. (2016, 264; also scHäfer (2017, 3).
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These authors give me a starting point to draw a sketch of what a deliberative 
legisprudence should look like. On the one hand, I endorse Schäffer’s sugges-
tion that we should avoid making assumptions about the ethical orientation of 
deliberating actors to our concepts of deliberation.90 He is led to this conclusion 
because incorporating those ethical motivations into our concepts of delibera-
tion “produces blind spots in our analytical tools that hinder us from capturing 
important aspects of deliberative practice, such as more contentious forms of 
deliberation”,91 and because actors’ motivations vary across different contexts.
This distinction is especially relevant for parliamentary contexts, as legis-
lators discharge their duties in a network of incentives that lead them to enter 
debates with strategic and positional stances, while asking them to discuss 
and debate with the counterparts about the matters they are to legislate about.
This dynamic of incentives I beneficial from a deliberative democratic 
point of view. Legislators, while acting strategically and trying to advance 
the position of the parties they are part of, they do so in ways that must ap-
peal to the views of those individuals they represent or try to represent. So, 
the main question is not how to avoid strategic behaviour in parliamentary 
deliberation, but how to make sure that legislators are indeed influenced by 
the citizens’ arguments and preferences.
On the other side of the tension, the next point will elaborate on how the 
views of citizens are formed through deliberation. One way of approaching 
this problem is by relying on Habermas’ idea of translation, a term he first 
rejects as inadequate to describe the special relationship that law has with the 
lifeworld. The latter’s autopoetical reproduction and linguistic specialisation 
constructs the law’s own image of the world. But then, Habermas acknowl-
edges, law is “supposed to ‘influence’ general social constructions of real-
ity, and in this way influence those other discursive worlds as well”.92 The 
initial rejection of the concept is due to the role it plays in systems theory, 
a construction that, in Habermas’ view, is not consistent with understanding 
law as a hinge between the lifeworld and the rest of the subsystems.93
Translation takes a more positive form afterwards, as Habermas incor-
porates it to reject paternalistic interferences of the bureaucratic system into 
civil society: 
In spite of asymmetrical access to expertise and limiting problem-solving ca-
pacities, civil society has the opportunity of mobilizing counterknowledge and 
drawing on the pertinent forms of expertise to make its own translations.94 
90 scHäfer (2017, 422).
91 scHäfer (2017, 422).
92 HaBermas (1996, 53).
93 HaBermas (1996, 53, 56).
94 HaBermas (1996, 372).
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This at the core of Habermas’ two-track model of democracy, in which 
“formally institutionalized deliberation and decision must be open to input 
form informal public spheres”.95 Nevertheless, the transmission from one 
track to the other is still a problem for deliberative democrats. With this in 
the background, I will rely on Boswell et al.’s to explain how transmission 
could operate in practice.
Transmission “places the emphasis on the connections between the vari-
ous components that that make up deliberative systems, particularly between 
public and empowered decision-making sites”.96 Boswell et al.’s analyse 
three mechanisms of transmission between individual agency at the level 
of the public sphere and formal institutional structures: middle democracy, 
democratic innovation, and discourses. The first, middle democracy, is a no-
tion taken from Gutmann & Thompson,97 according to which actors pursue 
matters of common interest through more traditional institutional spaces con-
ceived of to link the citizenry with public authorities (e. g., public hearings, 
legislative inquiries).98 The second, involves the notion of coupling, which 
describes connections between different (formal and informal) institutions 
and practices, which ideally would involve “’processes of convergence, mu-
tual influence and mutual adjustment” such that “each part would consider 
reasons and proposals generated in other parts”.99 Metaphorically, “coupling 
draws our attention to the nature and strength of relationships between dif-
ferent parts in a deliberative system, and to the spaces that might develop 
in-between”.100 The third refers to a broad ensemble of ideas, categories and 
metaphors which may enable actors across the system to draw on as shared 
argumentative resources.101
Boswell et al. conclude that transmission can occur via any of the three 
aforementioned mechanisms,102 that those avenues are not mutually exclusive, 
and suggest that current political institutions have the potential to enable 
transmission. The implication is that no significant changes would be neces-
sary to operationalise transmission in a meaningful way.103 Moreover, that 
transmission does not only take place when there is correspondence between 
deliberation in the public sphere and the one taking place in formal empow-
ered spaces. This, they argue, is at once too restrictive, for there are other 
forms of transmission besides policy impact, and too naïve, as “discursive 
95 reHG (1996, xxxi).
96 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 264).
97 Gutmann and tHompson (1996).
98 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 265).
99 mansBridGe, BoHman et al. (2012, 23).
100 HendriKs (2016, 44).
101 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 265); Dryzek (2009).
102 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 276).
103 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 276).
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affinity does not imply a substantive impact”.104 The study suggests that some 
semiformal spaces like commissions of inquiry or parliamentary committees 
“offer crucial mechanisms of transmission between informal public opinion 
(public space) and formal decision-making cycles (empowered space).105
Yet, the study also shows that, notwithstanding their potential as deliberative 
enablers, “relying on the existing institutional architecture may not always be 
sufficient” because “[s]ome deliberative systems […] will continue to feature 
exclusionary discourses and norms that do not recognize the legitimate meaning-
making power of counter publics, and for which there is no easy institutional 
fix”.106 Here, the role of mini-publics becomes relevant, given their capacity to 
bring together actors from the public sphere to a semi-institutionalised setting, 
they create the space to open up issues usually dominated by elites and expert 
policy makers and, in doing so, offer “a vital dose of democratic inclusivity, 
rendering the otherwise hidden or implicit value assumptions more visible, 
and transmitting lay perspectives on these that can challenge the status quo”.107
D. Constitutional mini-publics
Boswell et al.’s conclusion regarding the role of mini-publics in deliberative 
systems is both challenging and encouraging. It calls for the development 
of democratic innovations that open up spaces of interaction among citizens 
where they may debate about any issue they consider as relevant for the com-
munity, in coexistence with existing formal institutions. As it happens, the list 
of mini-publics and deliberative fora operating in this middle ground between 
the informal public sphere and formal decision-making public institutions is 
vast. 108 On the one hand, this limits my capacity to determine with accuracy 
just how much complexity can be dealt with by employing mini-publics. 
On the other, this variety shows that there seems to be no limitation on the 
topic and type of subject that can be deliberated on through mini-publics, 
constitutional matters included.
I am more concerned with some broad features and not with the precise 
configuration and fine-grained practical operation of some specific mini-
public which would somehow incarnate popular constitutionalism. Most 
mini-publics share a number of common features, for example, in the way 
they select their participants and in their procedures. I now elaborate on these 
aspects of a possible constitutional deliberative mini-public.
104 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 279)
105 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 276).
106 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 277).
107 Boswell, HendriKs and ercan (2016, 277).
108 Consider, for example, cHamBers (2003); funG (2003); Goodin & dryzeK (2006, 221-
225); delli carpini, lomax cooK & jaKoBs (2004); scHKade, sunstein & Hastie (2010); ryan 
& smitH (2014, 12). Also consider the staggering number of studies uploaded to participedia.net.
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1. Selection methods
Regarding selection methods, there are roughly three methods employed in 
mini-publics: self-selection, random selection, and stakeholder selection. Fol-
lowing Button & Ryfe, selection methods must answer two questions: who 
initiates the deliberative procedure, and who participates. Regarding the first, 
these authors found that three kinds of entities typically initiate a deliberative 
encounter: “grassroots civic groups, such as neighbourhood associations; 
nongovernmental organizations (nGos) […]; or government organizations”. 
Similarly, there are three “basic kinds of participation selection schemes: 
self-selection, random selection, and […] stakeholder selection”. The first 
two are self-explanatory. Stakeholder selection “involves organizers in a 
process of identifying groups likely to be affected by a decision and issuing 
a formal invitation to representatives of these groups”.109
I submit that an appropriate mini-public for constitutional deliberations 
should select its participants primarily by random selection, and it should 
be initiated, in Button & Ryfe’s vocabulary, by governmental organisation.
Moreover, the republican thrust of this proposal would also justify a duty 
to participate, unless justifications are provided.110 This does not exclude that 
some stakeholders may participate as such in the deliberations, in the same 
way that some organisations go to courts as amicus curiae. Random selection 
allows us to with some problems raised by alternative methods. It solves the 
problem that in self-selection schemes, individuals require more motivation 
and incentives to enter the process, and they would be more prone to abandon 
the process to the extent their initial motivations and incentives disappear – 
they may exit with relatively little cost. Moreover, self-selection would likely 
incorporate more politicised individuals with less willingness to change posi-
tions, which in the extremes would make the deliberative process superfluous, 
or polarised, to the extent that most members think alike.111
Random sampling has an egalitarian appeal lacking in alternative selection 
methods.112 Additionally, “[w]ith modern random samples, we can know a 
great deal about the chances that our sample is giving us the same results as 
those we would have gotten had we asked the entire population”.113 Moreover, 
random sampling is beneficial because, first, framing issues are less likely 
to emerge, given that participants are free from pressures of competitive re-
election. Second, randomness avoids the effects of self-selection, “which will 
109 Button & ryfe (2005, 23).
110 Like with compulsory voting, this is an issue that I leave aside and take as a given in 
this discussion.
111 sunstein (2002); scHKade, sunstein and Hastie (2010).
112 HendriKs (2005, 82).
113 fisHKin (1997, 44).
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often bias participation toward those who are heavily invested in positions that 
come with problematic frames attached”. Third, representative cross-sections 
of the population are more likely to multiply reflective and irreflective claims 
[frames], and “dilute opportunities for frame-based coalitions”.114
Of course, random sampling is no panacea. No sampling method can be 
completely representative of the entire population. Besides, the egalitarian 
appeal of these mechanisms wanes in the absence of corrective methods 
for the selection process (e. g., quotas). Yet, random samples and selections 
are still a very attractive choice for institutionalising a deliberative societal 
mechanism of constitutional interpretation, because this shortage in the 
representative capacity of random sampling methods is stronger the smaller 
the deliberative body. Contrariwise, the bigger the sample, the more repre-
sentative the mini-public.115
I must leave the question of the total number of participants necessary 
for my proposal unanswered as this is an issue that will depend on the size 
of the polity in which the mini-public is being implemented. Some indica-
tions in the literature range from Dahl’s recommendation of 1000 citizens 
for an population of roughly 246 million,116 to Ackerman & Fishkin’s 500 
for a population of roughly 292 million,117 or Gosh’s 200 for a population of 
roughly 22 million.118 There is nothing sacrosanct about these numbers, but 
given the aforementioned benefits of random sampling when the sample is 
higher, higher numbers are to be preferred to smaller ones. 
That the mini-public is organised by government means that it must be 
created by law and that it must operate on a regular basis. As to when, how 
often and for how long, I suggest the body should gather during congres-
sional election year, right before the legal and official beginning of electoral 
campaigns. This would provide those running for office with incentives to 
make their own views explicit, and participants with a sense that what they 
do matters, that both incumbents and campaigners listen and pay attention 
to their contribution, for they have electoral incentives to do so.119 This co-
incides broadly, for example, with Ackerman & Fishkin’s idea of celebrating 
Deliberation Day two weeks before national elections,120 but more discussion 
on this point is needed.
114 calvert & warren (2014, 212).
115 BäcHtiGer, setäla & Gröndlund (2014, 230). Consider, for example, Hendriks study 
on consensus conferences and planning cells: “[w]hen sample sizes are larger […] simple random 
sampling is usually employed and no adjustments are made to the sample to meet predetermined 
quotas”. HendriKs (2005, 82).
116 daHl (1989, 340).
117 acKerman and fisHKin (2004, 24-25).
118 GosH (2010, 346).
119 cHamBers (2012, 68).
120 acKerman and fisHKin (2004, 23).
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2. Procedure
A constitutional minipublic that provides spaces for ordinary citizens to deliber-
ate about the meaning of their constitutions ought to be structured in ways that 
they put interpretive problems at the centre. This means that participants must 
be aware that their deliberations and their result do not constitute a decision in 
a strong sense of the term, that those deliberations and their results are inter-
pretive, that is, that participants do not deliberate about the merits of changing 
or repealing constitutional norms but to provide them with meaning, and that 
the results of those deliberations will be transmitted to their representatives 
who, in turn, are mandated to take them into account in the justifications they 
provide for their legislative activity.
The non-decisional, non-binding nature of the procedure can be established 
by legal fiat. A law or a constitutional provision creating an interpretive and 
deliberative mini-public would limit its competences to debate about inter-
pretations. Additionally, it would establish the duty for parliamentarians to 
justify their normative production appealing to the interpretive understanding 
of the people resulting from the deliberations in the mini-public.
But agendas play a role as well. An interpretive constitutional delibera-
tive minipublic would be different from other democratic innovations. For 
example, traditional deliberative polls discuss matters previously selected by 
a leading convenor (Fishkin & Farrar 2005, 73). In interpretive constitutional 
deliberation the range of topics would be initially determined by the content 
of the constitution under debate. Convenors should have some leeway in the 
choice of topic within the limits of what is seen as a constitutional matter in 
the polity at hand.
Exactly what issues should be selected for interpretive discussion will 
depend also on the specific constitutional tradition. Some countries are in 
need of discussing some issues, some countries others, and the determination 
of which issue is more urgent is usually determined by political practice. 
Convenors should be aware of this.
The specifics of the deliberative procedure may vary, but I am sympathetic 
to the use of some versions of deliberative polling. In advance of the event, 
participants should be sent background material presenting them with a range 
of information and viewpoints on the interpretive matters to be discussed.121 
Also, their basic structure would include small-groups discussions, as well 
as the opportunity to come together as a large group in plenary sessions. In 
traditional deliberative polls, participants here have possibility to ask ques-
tions to an expert panel. I do not discard this, but in my design, the presence 
of representatives in that panel would be important, as this would permit 
121 acKerman and fisHKin (2004, 47); fisHKin and farrar (2005, 72-73).
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incumbents as well as those running for office to be in direct contact with 
participants and their deliberations. These would “help elites make decisions 
that have deliberative legitimacy”.122
The experiment would also include the administration of a final survey, 
whose results would then lead to a report that would be sent back to Congress.
3. And back to transmission
The results of discussions ought to be sent to parliamentarians for their manda-
tory use in legislative discussions and justification of decisions with bearings 
on constitutional law to the extent they refer to the discussions undertaken in 
the imagined mini-public. As I have argued above, members of parliament 
should incorporate these results explicitly in the Bills they propose and in 
the laws they pass. They may not agree with those interpretations, with how 
participants in the imagined mini-public think, with the likely consequences 
of the implementations of their interpretations, or with any other aspect result-
ing from the engagement with the results obtained. Their duty is to explicitly 
consider them in their deliberations and in the justification for their decisions 
whether they agree or disagree with them.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper undertook three tasks. First, sketched the principles grounding my 
understanding of popular constitutionalism. It then made exposed the flaws 
observed in some of the most articulate accounts attempting to make such 
project feasible. Finally, it shed lights on what a republican, deliberative, 
and egalitarian popular constitutionalism would look like. The specifics of 
the institutional design may vary, needless to say, and they certainly require 
more elaboration, but it is fair to say that it is compatible with the republican, 
deliberative and egalitarian principles here endorsed. This contributes to a 
body of literature in need of a revival.
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